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Throughout history, children have had a tendency to cause mischief,
damage and often injury to people and the property of others.
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I.

Introduction

Throughout history, children have had a tendency to cause mis-

chief, damage and often injury to people and the property of others.12
for their torts.

Under common law, minors are personally responsible

However, children rarely possess the means to compensate their vic-

tims.3 This creates a dilemma: Either the children's victims are left
without a remedy, or the children's parents must be held liable for the
damages.

At common law, the mere existence of the parent/child relationship was not a sufficient basis to invoke liability upon parents for the

torts of their minor children.4 The growth of modern tort law, however,
1.

M. HASKELL & L. YABLONSKY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 2 (3d ed. 1982); H.

SANDHU, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CAUSES, CONTROL, AND PREVENTION 5 (1977).
2. See Bieker v. Owens, 234 Ark. 97, 99, 350 S.W.2d 522, 524 (1961); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 123-at 912, 913 (5th ed. 1984); Note,
Criminal Liability of Parentsfor Failure to Control their Children, 6 VAL. U.L. REV.
332 (1972); Note, Parentand Child-Civil Responsibility of Parentsfor the Torts of
Children-StatutoryImposition of Strict Liability, 3 VILL. L. REV. 529 (1958).
Section 8951 of the second Restatement of Torts provides: "One who is an infant
is not immune from tort liability solely for that reason unless the liability depends upon
the enforceability of a contractual promise that the infant is privileged to disaffirm."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8951 (1979).
Comment (a) clarifies this general principle, adding that
[i]n intentional torts, the state of mind of the actor is an essential element.
For example, an intent to bring about a harmful or offensive physical contact is essential to battery. . . .A child may be of such tender years that
he. . .is in fact incapable of the specific intent that is iequired. It may
thus be found that the tort has not been committed. ...
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8951 comment a (1979).
3. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2.
4. See Bieker, 234 Ark. at 98, 350 S.W.2d at 523-24 (1961); Martin v. Barrett,
120 Cal. App. 2d 625, 628, 261 P.2d 551, 552-53 (1953); Condel v. Savo, 350 Pa. 350,
352, 39 A.2d 51, 52 (1944); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2; Comment,
Liability of Negligent Parentsfor the Torts of their Minor Children, 19 ALA. L. REV.
123 (1966); Note, A Constitutional Caveat on the Vicarious Liability of Parents, 87
NOTRE DAME LAW. 1321 (1972).
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has generally acknowledged the fact that parents, more than anyone
else, have the ability and opportunity to regulate the conduct of their
children. 5 It has even been postulated that "[t]here are no delinquent
children; there are only delinquent parents."'6 Thus, with this ability
and opportunity to control has come a duty to exercise this control over
one's child; 7 and a breach of this duty can result in liability.
The final acceptance of a policy establishing parental liability requires the resolution of numerous issues. Three questions are foremost
among these: 1) When should this duty arise? 2) What will constitute
a breach of this duty? and 3) What should the legal consequences be
for a breach?
Focusing on the law in Florida, this note will discuss these and
other related questions and will offer resolutions to the dilemma
presented. An examination of the family's role in the causes of juvenile
delinquency will exemplify the need for this parental duty. Moreover, a
survey of existing case law and legislation will demonstrate how Florida
and other jurisdictions have dealt with this sensitive issue. With specific
attention given to a case presently certified to the Florida Supreme
Court, 8 this note will present alternatives for clarification and modification of existing law.
II.

Juvenile Delinquency - The Family's Role

Although legal use of the term was not established until 1899,'
juvenile delinquency10 has plagued civilization throughout history."

5. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637-639 (1978); Bieker, 234 Ark. at 99,
350 S.W.2d at 524; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2 at 914; Comment, Liability of Negligent Parentsfor the Torts of their Minor Children, 19 ALA. L. REV. 123
(1966); cf. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME

215 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT].
6. Ludwig, Delinquent Parents and the Criminal Law, 5 VAND. L. REV. 719

(1952).
7. W.

PROSSER

& W.

KEETON,

supra note 2 at 914.

8. Snow v. Nelson, 450 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
9.

R.

CONTROL

TROJANOWICZ & M.

MORASH, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: CONCEPTS AND

12 (3d ed. 1983).

10. A "Delinquent Child" is defined as "[a]n infant of not more than specified
age who has violated criminal laws or engages in disobedient, indecent or immoral
conduct, and is in need of treatment, rehabilitation, or supervision." BI.ACK'S LAW
385 (5th ed. 1979).
See H. SANDHU, supra note 1.

DICTIONARY

11.
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Studies have attempted to determine the causes of and solutions to this
problem; 12 with sociologists, psychologists, theorists and commentators
all submitting opinions as to the causes of the maladjusted child. 13
Summarizing these philosophies, one commentator noted that "widely
accepted theories of causation fall into

. .

. [five] basic categories: (1)

personality factors (including biological, psychological, character and
behavior); (2) companions and peer group influence; (3) economic, cultural and environmental conditions; (4) . . . home and family conditions . . . [and] (5) opportunity as evoked by the victim
himself. . .1.4

As a primary source for the inculcation of one's morals and values,
the family has perhaps the greatest influence on the development of a
'good' or 'bad' child. The mixture of affection and discipline received in
the home has a great effect on a child's ability to deal with authority. 5
Studies reflect the fact that children from homes in which parents are
consistent and fair in their means of discipline are less likely to become
delinquents; whereas homes in which parents are inconsistent or use
extreme measures of corporal punishment 6 are subject to a greater risk
of turning out a recalcitrant, unbalanced and often delinquent child.' 7
This risk intensifies when there is a lack of affection present in the
home combined with an aura of parental apathy and acquiescence."8
The cumulative effect of these elements is crucial as "[r]ejected or neglected children who do not find love and affection, as well as support
and supervision, at home, often resort to groups outside the family; frequently these groups are of a deviant nature."' 9 While the state cannot
mandate familial love and harmony, arguably these studies evidence a
need to encourage, if not demand, parents to act responsibly in raising
12.

See, e.g., S.

GLUEK &

E.

A PANOJUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELIN-

GLUEK, OF DELINQUENCY AND CRIME,

RAMA OF YEARS OF SEARCH AND RESEARCH

(1974);

QUENCY PREVENTION, NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAN-

(1976); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 209-11.
See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 188-221; R. TROJANOWICZ & M. MORASH, supra note 9 at 38-132.
DARDS AND GOALS

13.

14. Shong, The Legal Responsibility of Parentsfor Their Children's Delinquency, 6 FAM. L. Q. 145, 152 (1972).
15.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

REPORT,

supra note 5, at 199.

16. Corporal Punishment is defined as "physical punishment as distinguished
from pecuniary punishment or a fine; any kind of punishment of or inflicted on the
body." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 306 (5th ed. 1979).
17. See H. SANDHU, supra note 1 at 53.
18. Id. at 53, 54.
19. R. TROJANOWICZ & M. MORASH, supra note 9 at 90.
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
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their children.
III.

Snow v. Nelson: 20 A Question is Raised

Randall Snow was seriously injured while playing a game with
Mark Nelson. The game, which Mark had invented, 2 was played in
the street and required "the use of two croquet mallets, two tennis balls
and 'speed.' "22 With each player continuously hitting his ball down the
street, racing toward a pre-designated target,23 the younger and faster
Randall gained the lead.24 In an effort to catch up, Mark took a "'fast
swing' . . . [despite the fact] that he saw 'a person' the whole time
.... -"25 Mark's errant swing struck Randall in the eye26 causing the
loss of his eye, as well as the permanent loss of his senses of taste and
smell.2 7
Randall's parents sued Mark's parents for negligent supervision of
their son.28 At trial, evidence indicated that Mark had a history of
playing roughly with other children. Testimony of Mark's neighbors
and playmates revealed that he was "a bully;"' 29 that he "push[ed] . . .
kids together . . . to make them fight;" 30 and that he "hit little kids
because 'they did not listen to him.' "1 Other neighbors, including
Randall's father, testified "that they had never complained to Mark's
parents . . . [about] Mark's activities." 2 Apparently, Mark's father
did have some prior notice of Mark's aggressive behavior, 33 although
through testimony he characterized this notice as "normal kids tattling
type things . . . [such as] 'Mark's playing too rough,' or one of the

20. Snow v. Nelson, 450 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
21. Brief for Appellant at 2, Snow v. Nelson, 450 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2, 3.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Brief for Appellee at 2, Snow v. Nelson, 450 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
33. Id. at 1.
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other kids are [sic] playing too rough. ...

The trial judge granted a directed verdict in favor of Mark's parents, the Nelsons, finding them totally free from negligence as a matter

of law. 35 The Snows appealed that decision to the Third District Court
of Appeal of Florida, which reluctantly affirmed the trial judge's decision. 36 Although the court of appeal appeared sympathetic with the

Snow's circumstances, it was bound by prior case law. 7 The Supreme
Court of Florida had ruled on this issue in 195538 in the case of Gissen
v. Goodwill.3 That decision established very narrow requirements40 for
the finding of parental negligence, and the Snows did not fall within
those requirments.

The Third District Court of Appeal, in a strongly worded Snow
opinion, urged a modification of these rules, leaving no doubt that
Gissen was the only barrier between an affirmance and a reversal of the
trial court's directed verdict.4 ' Finding an issue of great public impor-

34. Id.
35. Brief for Appellant at 5, Snow v. Nelson, 450 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
The trial judge did not immediately rule on the defendant's motion for a directed
verdict. He reserved this decision and instructed counsel to proceed with their closing
remarks to the jury. The jury was then instructed to consider the following issue in
their deliberations:
Whether the defendants were negligent in the supervision of their child,
Mark Nelson, and if so, whether such negligence was a legal cause of loss,
injury or damage sustained by the plaintiffs, Robert E. Snow and Cynthia
Snow, as parents and natural guardians of Randall K. Snow ...
Id. at 4.
After the jury left the courtroom to deliberate, the judge gave counsel a final opportunity to settle the case. Informed that a settlement was out of the question, he then
granted the motion for the directed verdict and stated:
Keeping with the Court's policy, of course, the jury will still determine this
matter. They will consider it and come back with a verdict. That verdict
will not be filed, but will be available so that if, upon appeal, in the unlikelihood that this Court is reversed in its directed verdict, then we will not
have to try the case again and the jury verdict will be reinstated.
Id. at 5.
Upon its return, the jury found Mark Nelson's parents seventy-five percent at
fault, with damages totaling $135,000. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 271.
36. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 270.
37. Id.
38. Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1955).
39. Id.
40. See infra text accompanying note 46.
41. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 270. Portraying the Gissen opinion as "harsh doctrine
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tance, the district court of appeal certified the following question to the
Supreme Court of Florida: "To what extent and in what manner may
parents be held legally responsiblefor injuries inflicted by their minor
42
children upon third parties?"
Under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, the state Supreme Court is not compelled to answer a certified question from a
district court of appeal. A query of this type falls within the Supreme
Court's discretionary jurisdiction.4 3 In Snow v. Nelson, however, the
Florida Supreme Court has granted certiorari, scheduling oral argument for early 1985.
IV.

A.

Judicial Expansion of the Common Law Standard

Florida

The necessity of the Snow certified question is a product of the
confusion arising out of Gissen v. Goodwill." Involving the claim of a
Miami Beach hotel employee against the parents of a child-tortfeasor,
Gissen established specific criteria in Florida for the determination of
parental liability. 45 The Supreme Court of Florida delineated these
standards as follows:
It is basic and established law that a parent is not liable for the
tort of his minor child because of the mere fact of his paternity.
However, there are certain broadly defined exceptions wherein a
parent may incur liability: 1. Where he intrusts his child with an

created in a distant and dissimilar era," Judge Jorgenson declared:
Because we are restrained by supreme court precedent, we affirm the trial
court's direction of a verdict for the parents of the alleged tortfeasor. However, because we are unable to reconcile the precedential supreme court
holding, or our own with what we feel to be the dictates of justice and
fairness and feel that it is time for a more enlightened approach to the
questions involved, we respectfully certify to the Supreme Court of Florida
that the present case passes upon a question of great public importance
and warrants a re-examination of the principles announced in Gissen v.
Goodwill.
Id. (citation omitted).
42. Id. at 275 (emphasis supplied).
43. FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v).
44. 80 So. 2d at 701.
45. Id. at 703.
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instrumentality which because of the lack of age, judgment, or experience of the child, may become a source of danger to others. 2.
Where a child, in the commission of a tortious act, is occupying the
relationship of a servant or agent of its parents. 3. Where the parent knows of his child's wrongdoing and consents to it, directs or
sanctions it. 4. Where he fails to exercise parental control over his
minor child, although he knows or in the exercise of due care
should have 6 known that injury to another is a probable
consequence.1
Mr. Julius Gissen, the -plaintiff, asserted in his complaint that
eight-year-old Geraldine Goodwill and her parents were "business invitees"4 7 at a Miami Beach hotel where Gissen was employed when the
claimed tort took place.48 His complaint further alleged that Geraldine
was a constant source of turmoil for the hotel's guests and employees,4 9
and that these tantrums continued without any attempts by her parents
to exercise restraint.50 This conduct culminated in Mr. Gissen's injury
when Geraldine slammed a hotel door, violently severing a portion of a
finger from his hand. 5 Alleging parental negligence in the "exercise of
needful parental influence and authority," Mr. Gissen sued Geraldine's
parents, claiming that their acquiescence was, in effect, a "sanctioning,
ratif[ication], and consenting to the wrongful act . . . [thus causing]

injury to another . . . [to be] a probable consequence .... ",52
The Gissen court looked to the language of section 316 of the second Restatement of Torts5 3 and to prior decisions from seven other jurisdictions 54 for guidance in its ruling. From these cases, the court

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 702.
Id.
Id.

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. id.
53. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965) states:
A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his minor
child as to prevent it from intentionally harming others or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if
the parent
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his
child, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.
54. See Bateman v. Crim, 34 A.2d 257 (D.C. 1943) (affirmed directed verdict in
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found "[o]ne common factor . . . [to be] salient in the assessment of
liability to the parents, . . . [this being] that the child had the habit of
doing the particular type of wrongful act which resulted in the injury

complained of."55 This holding, creating what has since been referred
to as the "particularacts rule, ' 56 precluded Julius Gissen from ob-

taining compensation for his injury. The Florida Supreme Court entered judgment against him because he had not claimed that Geraldine
"had a propensity to swing or slam doors at the hazard of persons using
such doors."15 7 In the absence of an assertion of such particular acts, his
petition failed to allege actionable negligence.
At first blush, this holding appeared to logically follow from the
rule which the court set down. A discrepancy, however, surfaced when
the opinion apparently contradicted this particular act requirement

with the subsequent declaration that "a wrongful act by an infant
which climaxes a course of conduct involving similar acts may lead to

favor of defendants as there was no evidence to indicate that boys who injured plaintiff
while playing football in street "had previously played with a football on the public
streets or had conducted . . . [themselves] in other than an orderly manner." Id. at
258.); Steinberg v. Cauchois, 249 A.D. 518, 293 N.Y.S. 147 (N.Y. App. Div. 1937)
(parents were not liable as evidence was not sufficient to show that they had notice that
child who hit plaintiff with bicycle on sidewalk was accustomed to riding on sidewalk);
Condel v. Savo, 350 Pa. 350, 39 A.2d 51 (1944) (parents who had been notified of
their child's "habit of mauling, pummeling, assaulting and mistreating smaller children," were negligent in failing to exercise reasonable care so to control . . .[him and]
prevent him from intentionally . . .[assaulting the plaintiff's child and throwing him]
down a steep and precipitous embankment." Id. at 351, 39 A.2d at 52.); Norton v.
Payne, 154 Wash. 241, 281 P. 991 (1929) (child with "habit of striking smaller children in the face with sticks . . . struck [plaintiffs' child] in the eyeball with a stick...
and parents encouraged her in her habit." Id. at 241, 281 P. at 991); Martin v. Barrett,
120 Cal. App. 2d 625, 261 P.2d 551 (1953) (see infra notes 102, 103 and accompanying text); Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953) ("'parents
negligently . . .failed to warn . . .[babysitter of their] child's . . .[habit of] 'violently attacking and throwing himself forcibly .. . against other people' . . . and
shortly after plaintiff entered . . .[their] home the child attacked her to her resultant
injury." Id. at 317, 261 P.2d at 679.); Ryle v. Lafferty, 45 F.2d 641 (D. Idaho 1930)
(child with "habit of persuading and inveigling smaller boys into secluded places ...
and of beating, bruising, maiming, and punishing [them] .. .persuaded and inveigled
the plaintiff. . . to go with him to a secluded place . . . and . . . beat . . . him . . ..
[Defendant P]arents had knowledge of. . .[this habit] and had failed to take steps to
restrain him from continuing.
...
Id. at 641-643).
55. Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 705.
56. See, e.g., Snow, 450 So. 2d at 274 (emphasis supplied).
57. Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 705.
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the parents' accountability." 58 A question arises as to the specific effect
of this additional "similar acts" language: Whether the decision actually established a "particular acts rule" or a "similar acts rule" for the
state of Florida. From the result in Gissen it would appear that a particular act rule is the standard. 59 Arguably, Mr. Gissen's claim did
demonstrate a course of conduct involving similar acts by Geraldine

Goodwill. 60 However, that showing was insufficient for the court to impose liability. 1
At least one Florida district court of appeal has followed the narrow interpretation of the Gissen standard. In the 1972 case, Spector v.
Neer,6 2 the Third District Court of Appeal held that the plaintiffs

failed to establish negligence on the part of the parent/defendants"
because the plaintiffs did not allege that the defendant's child "had a
habit of doing the particular type of wrongful act which resulted in the
injuries. . . ."64A review of other case law, however, indicates that

Gissen has been subject to various interpretations. 5 In Seabrook v.
Taylor,6 6 for example, the Fourth District Court of Appeal stated:

58. Id. (emphasis supplied).
59. The Third District Court of Appeal in Snow was convinced of this fact,
Judge Jorgenson emphatically stating:
[W]e feel that as the rule was applied to the facts in Gissen even fact
patterns where the injury should reasonably have been foreseen to flow,
under the similar acts rule, as a natural and probable consequence from
the child's course of conduct involving similar acts would be insufficient to
survive a legal preclusion of submission to the factfinder. If the facts in
Gissen were not sufficient for a determination that the child's course of
behavior would naturally and probably result in injury, what facts could
be?
Snow, 450 So. 2d at 274.
60. Mr. Gissen's complaint alleged that prior to the door slamming incident, Geraldine Goodwill "committed . . .[other acts] about the hotel premises, such as striking, knocking down and damaging objects of furniture . . . disturbing and harassing
the guests and employees .. . [as well as] striking . . . [them] so that . . . [her]

persistent course of conduct would as a probable consequence result in injury to another." Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 702.
61. Id. at 705-706.
62. 262 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
63. Id. at 690.
64. Id.
65. The Snow court made this assertion in harsher terms. See infra, text accompanying note 76.
66. 199 So. 2d 315, (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied mem., 204 So. 2d 331
(Fla. 1967).
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
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[T]he Gissen case does not hold specifically that those exceptions
enumerated therein are exclusive. In all cases the question of liability is to be determined on the broad basis of whether or not the
parent has been guilty of negligence, that is, a failure to exercise

due care in the circumstances.67

The latter part of this language was subsequently cited with approval
in Southern American Fire Insurance Co. v. Maxwell,68 a case falling
within the dangerous instrumentality exception 69 asserted in Gissen.
Also coming within this exception was Bullock v. Armstrong,70 where
the Second District Court of Appeal looked to the states of Georgia"'
and North Carolina 71 for guidance. From these states Bullock quoted
case law which effectively held that parental liability is to be determined by "'the ordinary rules of negligence and not upon the relation
of parent and child.' "'
While these Florida cases do not expressly disaffirm the holding in
Gissen,"4 the Third District's opinion in Snow v. Nelson75 stated the
following:
Implicit in these holdings is a rejection of the rule expressed in
Gissen, both in its broader, similar acts, and narrower particular
acts, senses and an adaptation of what we here characterize as the
reasonable care in the circumstances rule: a determination based
upon the unique facts of each case and an application of the lan-

67. Id. at 317.
68. 274 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed mem., 279 So. 2d 32
(Fla. 1973) ("trial judge was correct in submitting ...case to the jury to conclude
whether or not ... [defendants] failed to exercise the ...

parental duty to ascertain

if the[ir five year old] child was competent to control [a] bicycle without supervision."
Id. at 581.)
69. See the exceptions enumerated in Gissen, supra text accompanying notes 45,
46.
70. 180 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (the negligence of a "parent
entrusting a [five year old] child . . . with a stroller, with instructions to push it in a
crowded department store without supervision [was] . . .a jury question rather than

one of law .. " Id. at 481.)
71. Hulsey v. Hightower, 44 Ga. App. 455, 161 S.E. 664 (1931).
72. Langford v. Shu, 258 N.C. 135, 128 S.E.2d 210 (1962).
73. Bullock, 180 So. 2d at 481 (quoting Langford, 258 N.C. at 139, 128 S.E.2d
at 213.
74. 80 So. 2d at 701.
75. 450 So. 2d at 269.
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/8
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guage of [section 316 of] the Restatement [(Second) of Torts]."
It is apparent that confusion does exist within the state of Florida as to
not only what the standard is, but also what it should be. A survey of

the laws of other jurisdictions will be helpful in achieving an objective
resolution of these controversies.

B.

The Law in Other Jurisdictions

Most courts recognize, as a general rule, the common law caveat
that parents cannot be held liable for their children's acts simply be-

cause of the parent-child relationship.7 7 In fact, any such vicarious liability,78 imposed as an exception to the general rule, occurs only when
provided by statutes, which allow limited monetary damages, 79 or when
the family relationship is not a determining factor. For example, when

the parent and the child maintain a master/servant relationship, s" the
laws of agency81 and respondeat superior

2

govern their acts and the

parent/master will be vicariously liable for the child/servant's torts.
Parental liability, in most cases, is based on the parent's own negli-

gent conduct which has caused or at least allowed the child's wrongful
acts to occur. Parental liability is, therefore, direct rather than vicariId. at 274.
77. See supra note 4.
78. Vicarious liability is defined as "[i]ndirect legal responsibility; for example,
the liability of an employer for the acts of an employee, or, a principal for torts and
contracts of an agent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1404 (5th ed. 1979).
79. See infra note 115.
80. As defined in the Restatement of Agency:
(1) A master is a principal who employs an agent to perform service in his
affairs and who controls or has the right to control the physical conduct of
the other in the performance of the service.
(2) A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his
affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master.
76.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 2 (1958).

81. An agency is defined as "the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." Id. at § 1.
82. Respondeat superior is a maxim meaning "that a master is liable in certain
cases for the wrongful acts of his servant. [This d]octrine applies only when relation of
master and servant existed between defendant and wrongdoer at time of injury sued
for, in respect to very transaction from which it arose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1179 (5th ed. 1979). (citation omitted).
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
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For example, parents have been held responsible for damage

which results from the accessibility 84 or entrustment85 of dangerous in-

strumentalities to their children. These devices are either inherently
dangerous,"' or they become so due to the young age or lack of experience of the child. 87 The parental indiscretion in making these instruments available to the child is the basis for liability in these cases. In
fact some jurisdictions impose a duty on parents to be aware of their
child's inability to use certain instruments responsibly. 88 Direct liability
is also levied on parents who consent to, 89 ratify9" or direct 1 the delin-

83.

See supra note 78.

84. See, e.g., Seabrook, 199 So. 2d at 315 (parents who kept loaded pistol in
unlocked place were not negligent as a matter of law as case was properly submitted to
jury). But see Bell v. Adams, 111 Ga. App. 819, 143 S.E.2d 413 (1965) (intentional
shooting of plaintiff's son by defendant's son was an independent criminal act intervening between the defendant's negligence and the injury and thus could not have been
foreseen by the defendant).
85. See Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 703. The Second Restatement of Torts describes
under what circumstance a person is liable for negligent entrustment:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of
another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the
supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to
liability for physical harm resulting to them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965).
See also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, at 914; Comment, Liability of
Negligent Parentsfor the Torts of their Minor Children, 19 ALA. L. REV. 123 (1966).
86. An inherently dangerous object is defined as one "which has in itself the
potential for causing harm or destruction, against which precautions must be taken.
Dangerous per se, without requiring human intervention to produce harmful effects;
e.g., explosives." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 703 (5th ed. 1979).
87. See infra NOTE 91; see also Southern American Fire Insurance Co. v. Max-

well, 274 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Gudziewski v. Stemplesky, 263
Mass. 103, 106, 160 N.E. 334, 335 (1928) (question of defendant's son being fit to
possess and use an air gun was for the jury); Wilbanks v. Brazil, 425 So. 2d 1123 (Ala.
1983) (mother was not liable for entrusting golf clubs to eight year old son. "If it is
found to be negligent to entrust golf clubs to an ordinary eight-year-old, then parents
would have to keep the golf clubs and similar sports equipment. . . under lock and key
and never allow a child to play with them except when he or she is under some sort of
expert supervision." Id. at 1125.); Thibodeau v. Cheff, 24 Ont. L.R. 214 (Div. Ct.
1911) (child with habit of lighting matches destroyed plaintiff's property-father liable
for failure to control upon notice).
88. See supra note 87.
89. See, e.g., Ryle v. Lafferty, 45 F.2d 641, 642 (D. Idaho 1930); Gissen v.
Goodwill, 80 So. 2d at 703; Langford v. Shu, 258 N.C. 135, 139, 128 S.E.2d 210, 212;
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quent acts of their minor children.
This note focuses upon the most controversial type of direct parental liability: Parental negligence for the failure to control one's child.
Such negligence stems from the parental duty to exercise restraint and
control over the child. 92 Recognizing this "guiding role of parents in
the upbringing of their children" 93 the Supreme Court of the United
States declared:
[D]eeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradition, is the belief
that the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority
over one's children. Indeed, 'constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their
own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the
structure of our society.' "1
Thus, it is clearly established that parents must exercise some degree of
control over the conduct of their children. However, questions still exist
as to when this duty should be imposed and how its breach should be
treated. Arguably, the best method for determining these questions is
to apply the same test necessary to establish a prima facie case in any
other negligence action; 95 i.e. a failure to exercise reasonable care
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, at 914.

90. See, e.g., Ryle, 45 F.2d at 642; Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 703; Hulsey v.
Hightower, 44 Ga. App. 455, 458, 161 S.E. 664, 666 (1931); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, at 914.
91. See, e.g., Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 703; Seabrook, 199 So. 2d at 317; Ryle, 45
F.2d at 642; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, at 914.
92. When imposed, this duty is based on the parents' opportunity and ability to
control the child, as was stated by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Bieker v. Owens,
234 Ark. 97, 350 S.W.2d 522 (1961):
[H]ere we are not concerned with the negligence of a child but with the
negligence of the parent in permitting, either actively or passively, a minor
willfully or negligently to commit such acts which could reasonably be expected to cause injury to another. It is within reason and good logic to say
that the parent has a responsibility to control minor children while they
are in their formative years. For while they are not in the custody of the
parents, absent any official action to the contrary, no other source of control may be found.
Id. at 99, 350 S.W.2d at 524. See also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, at
914.
93. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637 (1979).
94. Id. at 638.
95. See, e.g., Lane v. Chatham, 251 N.C. 400, 402, 111 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1959);
Hulsey v. Hightower, 44 Ga. App. 455, 460, 161 S.E. 664, 667 (1931); Langford v.
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under the circumstances. 96 This seems to be the true essence of the
language which is found in section 316 of the second Restatement of
Torts. Moreover, it is also the standard applied in the Florida cases of
Seabrook v. Taylor,97 Bullock v. Armstrongt 8 and Southern American
Fire Insurance Co. v. Maxwell9 and advocated by the Third District
Court of Appeal in Snow v. Nelson.100
As an alternative to this general negligence approach, some courts
require specific criteria to be present before this parental duty arises
and its breach occurs. The most restrictive of these alternatives is found
in states which hold parents liable only if their child has had a propensity or habit to commit the same exact wrongful act as that being alleged. 0 1 The narrower, particular act interpretation of Gissen would
bring Florida within this category of states.
In Martin v. Barrett'0 2 a California district court of appeal established such a rule by affirming the dismissal of a complaint against the
parents of a twelve-year-old boy who shot the plaintiff's child in the eye
with an air rifle. The court found that the defendant/father was unaware of any prior misuse of the gun or that his boy was using it on the
occasion of the injury. Although the boy's mother was aware of the
gun's use on this occasion, she had no previous notice of any prior misuse of the gun by her son.' 0 3 In Bieker v. Owens'04 the Arkansas Supreme Court found that the defendants had knowledge of their two
sons' habits of "striking, beating and abusing other younger men less
physically endowed than themselves. . . .,111 Despite this knowledge
the parents took no action to correct this behavior. Thus, the parents

Shu, 258 N.C. 135, 139, 128 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1962); cf. Mitchell v. Wiltfong, 4 Kan.
App. 2d 231, 234, 604 P.2d 79, 82 (1979).
96. See supra note 53.
97. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
99. 274 So. 2d at 581; see supra note 68.
100. See supra text accompanying note 76.
101. This is the nature of the controverted 'particular acts' rule which may or
may not currently exist in Florida. See, e.g., Ross v. Souter, 81 N.M. 181, 464 P.2d
911 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970); Horton v. Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 526 P.2d 304 (1974);
Bocock v. Rose, 213 Tenn. 195, 373 S.W.2d 441 (1963); Norton v. Payne, 154 Wash.
241, 281 P. 991 (1929); Linder v. Bidner, 50 Misc. 2d 320, 270 N.Y.S.2d 427 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1966).
102. 120 Cal. App. 2d 625, 261 P.2d 551 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
103. Id. at 628, 261 P.2d at 553.
104. 234 Ark. 97, 350 S.W.2d 522 (1961).
105. Id. at 98, 350 S.W.2d at 523.
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were held liable for the injuries when their sons dragged the plaintiff
from a car and severely beat him. In Caldwell v. Zaher'0 6 the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts found that a cause of action was stated against
the parents of a child with a "tendency and propensity toward assaulting, accosting, tormenting, and molesting young children.' 0 7 This
cause of action was predicated on the fact that they had received notice
of this conduct.'
The general negligence approach to the resolution of this issue is a

fairly broad means of determining liability while the particular acts
approach, on the other hand, is highly restrictive, with liability imposed
in a very limited scenario. A compromise or middle ground can be
found between these two extremes in the 'similar acts' or 'course of
conduct' approach. This latter method, employing features of the other
two, ' 9 is the less restrictive interpfetation of the standard set down in
Gissen.

While these various applications of parental negligence contain
different degrees of notice requirements, it seems that the failure to
attempt some type of restraint over the child is fundamental to the

finding of liability under each theory. This is reflected in cases in which
the plaintiff has failed to establish this point." 0 In Ross v. Souter,"'

106. 344 Mass. 590, 183 N.E.2d 706 (1962).
107. Id. at 591, 183 N.E.2d at 706.
108. Id. at 591, 183 N.E.2d at 706-07; cf.Lane v. Chatham, 251 N.C. 400, 111
S.E.2d 598 (1959) (mother with prior knowledge of son's misuse of air rifle found
liable, while father with no such knowledge was not liable).
109. See, e.g., Moore v. Crumpton, 306 N.C. 618, 295 S.E.2d 436 (1982). In
this case the Supreme Court of North Carolina declared:
Before it may be found that a parent knew or should have known of the
necessity for exercising control over the child, it must be shown that the
parent knew or in the exercise of due care should have known of the
propensities of the child and could have reasonably foreseen that failure to
control those propensities would result in injurious consequences. This does
not mean that the particular injury occurring must have been foreseeable,
but merely that consequences of a generally injurious nature might have
been expected.
Id. at 624, 295 S.E.2d at 440. (citations omitted).
110. See, e.g., Horton v. Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 526 P.2d 304 (1974). In that
case plaintiff's infant was severely injured when assaulted by the defendant's two children. Testimony indicated that the defendant/mother had "reprimanded her children
for . . .previous assault-like behavior." The Supreme Court of Colorado found this
"testimony [to] indicate . . . that [the mother] . . .exercised due care in watching
over [her sons]. . . ." Thus the Court of Appeals decision that the "issue of . . . [defendant/mother's] negligence should not have been submitted to the jury . . ."was

Published by NSUWorks, 1984

15

Nova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 8

Nova Law Journal

[Vol. 9

for example, evidence indicated that the parents of a minor tortfeasor

had knowledge of their child's "disposition to engage in fights and injure other children."

112

However, the plaintiff's case did not demon-

strate a failure to act by the defendants. In fact a school principal testified that the defendant/mother had reprimended her son in the school
office."13 Thus, New Mexico's Court of Appeals, in Ross, held that the
defendants were not responsible for the injuries sustained by the plain-

tiff's child.
While these various theories hold parents directly liable for their
own negligence, modern tort law has seen a movement among Ameri-

can states to hold parents vicariously liable, at least to a limited extent,
for some torts committed by their minor children.

V.

Statutory Vicarious Liability

As previously indicated, common law did not allow the imputation
of parental liability from the mere existence of the parent/child relationship." 4 Today, however, every American state" 5 has statutorily im-

upheld. Id. at 154, 526 P.2d at 307.
111. 81 N.M. 181, 464 P.2d 911 (1970).
112. Id. at 184, 464 P.2d 914.
113. Id.
114. See supra note 4.
115.
AGE STATE OF
PI
MAX
MIND
RECOV. COV? LIMITS
ALA. CODE § 6-5-380 (1975).
ALASKA STAT. § 34.50.020 (1975).
ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-661 (1956 & Supp.

1982).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-109 (Supp. 1983).
CAL. CiV. CODE § 1714.1 (Deering 1984).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-107 (Supp. 1973 & 1983).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572 (West Supp. 1984).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 3922 (1974 & Supp. 1980).
FLA. STAT. § 741.24 (1983).
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-3 (1976 & Supp. 1984).

500
2000

N
N

18
18

Int/M/W
M/W

2500
2000
10000
3500
3000
5000
2500
5000

Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N

Minor
18
Minor
18
Minor
18
18
18

M/W
M/W
M/W
M/W
M/W
Int/R
M/W
M/W

HAWAII REV. STAT. § 577-3 (1976).

none

T

Minor

IDAHO CODE § 6-210 (1979).

1500

N

18

M/W

1000
2500
1000
1000
2500

Y
Y
Y
Y
N

11-19
Child
18
18
Minor

M/W
Int
Unlaw
M/W
W

none

D

Minor

*

800
5000

Y
Y

7-17
Child

M/W

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70 §§ 53-57 (Smith-Hurd Supp.

1983).
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-31-1 (Burns Supp. 1984).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.16 (West Supp. 1983).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-120 (1981).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.025 (Supp. 1982).
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (West 1979).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 217 (Supp. 1979).
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-829 (1984).
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posed some type of vicarious liability upon parents for their children's
acts. Legislatures give consideration to numerous issues when composing these statutes. For example, twenty of the fifty states permit redress
for property damage only, while the remainder redress personal injury
as well. 1 16 Age of the tortfeasor is often a consideration, with some
states establishing a minimum age"17 and all setting a maximum. Other
criteria for recovery include a requirement in most states that the

child's actions be willful, wanton or malicious." 8
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85G (West
MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2913 (1983).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 540.18 (West 1984).
MiSS. CODE ANN. § 93-13-2 (1983).
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.045 (Vernon 1984).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-237 (1983).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-801 (1978).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.470 (1979).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 592-A:16 (1974).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-15 (West 1984).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-46 (1981).

1984).

N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 78-a (Consol. 1983).
N.C. GEN. STAT. .§ 1-538.1 (1983).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39 (1976).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.9 to 3109.10 (Page
1980).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 10 (West Supp. 1983).
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.765 (1983).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2001-2005 (Purdon Supp.
1983).
R.I. GEN. LAWS 8 9-1-3 (Supp. 1983).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-340 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1983).

S.D.

CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-5-15 (Supp. 1983).
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-10-101, -102, -103 (1984).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.01, -.02 (Vernon 1975 &

Supp. 1984).
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-11-20, -21 (1977).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 901 (1974).
VA. CODE §§ 8.01-43, -44 (1984).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.190 (Supp. 1984).
W. VA. CODE § 55-7A-2 (Supp. 1984).
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.035 (West 1983).

WYo.

STAT.

§ 14-2-203 (1978).

2000
2500
500

Y
Y
Y

7-18
Minor
18

W
M/W
M/W

2000
2000

N
Y

10-18

M/W
Pur

2500

N

18

1000

Y

Minor

10000

Y

Minor

M/W
W/Int
W

fine
none
2500
1500
1000

1000

N
N
Y
N
Y
N

Minor
18
Child
10-18
Minor
Minor

M/W
M/W
M/W
M/W
M/W

3k/2k
2500
5000

Y
Y
Y

18
18
Minor

M/W
Crim

1000
1500

Y
Y

18
Minor

W/T
M/W

1000

N

17

M/Int

750

Y

18

M/W

10000

N

18

M/W

15000

N
N

12-18
Minor

M/W

Y

17

Int
M/W

N
Y
Y
Y
N

Minor
18
Minor
Minor
10-17

M/W
M/W
M/W
M/W
M/W

1000
250
500
3000
2500
1000
300

18

*

Int

MAX RECOV. = Maximum amount recoverable from tortfeasor's parent(s).
none = no limit; k = thousand; fine = fine imposed on parent.
PI COV? = Personal Injury Covered by statute.
Y = Yes; N = No; T = Torts; D = Damages.
AGE LIMITS = Limits on age of tortfeasor.
STATE OF MIND = Tortfeasor's state of mind at time tort was committed.
M = Malicious; W = Willful; Unlaw = Unlawful; Int = Intentional; R = Reckless;
Pur = Purposeful; Crim = Criminal; Del = Delinquent; T = Tortious; * = Statute does not
refer to state of mind.
116. See table of statutes in note 115.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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Florida enacted a Parental Liability Statute in 1965.119 In its current form it provides victims with recovery of "actual damages . . . not
to exceed $2,500. ' ' 120 This is characteristic of all such statutes which
usually reward the victim a limited sum, no matter how great his or her

loss.'

These limits are fairly low, ranging from $250 to $15,000, de-

pending on the jurisdiction. 122 The imposed cap on these rewards indi-

cates that the legislative intent of such statutes is to punish parents and
discourage juvenile delinquency, while compensation of victims seems
to be a secondary consideration. 23
If the legislative goal in enacting these laws is indeed the preven-

tion of juvenile delinquency through parental responsibility, one commentator suggests that a barrier might exist to the fulfillment of this
objective.
An underlying assumption of the legislation is that parents, indif-

FLA. STAT. § 45.20 (1965).
120. FLA. STAT. § 741.24 (1983) is entitled "Civil action against parents; willful
destruction or theft of property by minor." It provides:
(1) Any municipal corporation, county, school district, or department
of Florida; any person, partnership, corporation, or association; or any religious organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated, shall be entitled to recover damages in an appropriate action at law in an amount not
to exceed $2,500, in a court of competent jurisdiction, from the parents of
any minor under age of 18 years, living with the parents, who shall maliciously or willfully destroy or steal property, real, personal, or mixed, belonging to such municipal corporation, county, school district, department
of the state, person, partnership, corporation, association, or religious
organization.
(2) The recovery shall be limited to the actual damages in an amount
not to exceed $2,500, in addition to taxable court costs.
121. See Note, The Iowa ParentalResponsibility Act, 55 IOWA L. REv. 1037,
1041 (1970).
122. See table of statutes in note 115.
123. The Supreme Court of North Carolina explicitly noted its observation of
this factor in General Insurance Company of America v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130
S.E.2d 645 (1963):
[These] statutes appear to have been adopted not out of consideration for
providing a restorative compensation for the victims of injurious or tortious
conduct of children, but as an aid in the control of juvenile delinquency.

119.

Thus, the limitation . . . of liability to malicious or wilful acts of children,
as well as the limitation of liability to an amount not to exceed . . .[X
dollars] .. .fails to serve any of the general compensatory objectives of

tort law.
Id. at 323, 130 S.E.2d at 650.
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ferent to the current activities of their children, have a sufficient
interest in the law to be familiar with the limitations of the existing
rules concerning their liability for consequences of those activities.
It is further assumed that those indifferent parents, informed of the
change made by the legislature, will undertake their
responsibilities
1 4
of instruction and supervision of their children. 1

While this may often be the case, it is submitted that the parent who is
penalized for his or her child's activities will have no choice but to take
notice of such laws and act accordingly. With this threat, perhaps the
parent will begin to undertake these responsibilities in a more serious
manner.
These statutes have been the subject of other types of criticism as
well.125 For example, it has been contended that many states have
passed laws which are inherently vague.' 26 The main assertion is that
statutes which purport to apply to "parents" do not specify as to the
scope of this word. In Florida this question was raised in Wyatt v. Mc1 with the First District Court of Appeal holding that "[t]here
Mullen'27
is no difference, so far as common law tort liability is concerned, between one in loco parentis' 28 and a natural parent."' 2 9
In a number of cases these statutes have been challenged as unconstitutional. a30 However, in only one instance has a statute been ad-

124. Note, Parental Liability for Wilful and Malicious Acts of Children, 36
L. REv. 327, 327-28 (1961).
125. See, e.g., Note, supra note 124 at 327-331; Note, supra note 121 at 10411048; Note, A ConstitutionalCaveat on the Vicarious Liability of Parents,87 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 1321, 1326-34 (1972).
126. Note, supra note 121 at 1044.
127. 350 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
128. One who is in loco parentis is said to be "[i]n the place of a parent;
charged, factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties and responsibilities." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 708 (5th ed. 1979).
129. Wyatt, 350 So. 2d at 1117.
130. See Bryan v. Kitamura, 529 Fed. Supp. 394 (D. Hawaii 1982); Alber v.
Nolle, 98 N.M. 100, 645 P.2d 456 (1982); Stang v. Waller, 415 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Haywood v. Ramick, 248 Ga. 841, 285 S.E.2d 697 (1982); Board
of Education of Piscataway Township v. Caffiero, 173 N.J. Super. 204, 413 A.2d 981
(1980), aff'd, 88 N.J. 308, 431 A.2d 799, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981);
Vanthournout v. Burge, 69 Il1.App. 3d 193, 387 N.E.2d 341 (1979); Rudnay v. Corbett, 53 Ohio App. 2d 311, 374 N.E.2d 171 (1977); Watson v. Gradzik, 34 Conn.
Super. 7, 373 A.2d 191 (Conn. C.P. 1977); In Re Sorrell, 20 Md. App. 179, 315 A.2d
110 (1974); Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971); Mahaney v.
Hunter Enterprises, Inc., 426 P.2d 442 (Wyo. 1967); General Insurance Company v.
WASH.
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judicated as such. In Corley v. Lewless, 1"1 the Georgia Supreme Court
held the Georgia parental liability statute void because the statute violated both state and Federal due process requirements. 32 However, the
Georgia statute was distinguishable from other state statutes because
Georgia's contained no limits on recovery.' 33 It sought to provide full
redress for both personal injury and property damage. Since the 1971
Corley ruling, the Georgia General Assembly has adopted a new statute,13 1 omitting the defects which plagued its predecessor.1' 5 This new
legislation expressly states an intention to control delinquency as it
places a limit on parental liability. 36 In 1982 this new statute withstood a constitutional challenge in Hayward v. Ramick."7 The Georgia
Supreme Court declared:
We hold that this statute, intended to aid iii reducing juvenile delinquency by imposing liability upon parents who control minors is
neither unreasonable, arbitrary nor capricious. We further hold
that the state has a legitimate interest in the subject (controlling
juvenile delinquency), and that there is a rational relationship between the means used (imposing liability upon parents of children
38
who wilfully or maliciously damage property) and this object.
This language was quoted with approval in Stang v. Waller, 39 the
Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida ruling "that the better view
[of
Florida's
Parental
Liability
Statute]
supports
constitutionality ...
.
Other challenges to statutory constitutionality have been unsuccessful. In General Insurance Company of America v. Faulkner,41 for
example, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that these statutes

Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963); Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
131. 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971).
132. Id. at 751, 182 S.E.2d at 770.
133. Id. at 749-750, 182 S.E.2d at 769-770.
134. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-3 (1976 & Supp. 1982).
135. Id.; Hayward v. Ramick, 248 Ga. 841, 285 S.E.2d 697 (1982).
136. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-3(c) (1976 & Supp. 1982).
137. 248 Ga. at 841, 285 S.E.2d at 697.
138. Id. at 843, 285 S.E.2d at 699.
139. 415 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
140. Id.
141. 259 N.C. at 317, 130 S.E.2d at 645.
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fall within the state's police power. 4 ' A unique assertion of unconstitutionality was made in the case of Watson v. Gradzik'4 3 in 1977 when
the defendant parents of a child tortfeasor claimed that Connecticut's
parental liability statute "interfere[d] with the fundamental right to
bear and raise children." 4 4 The court found the challenged statute to
be constitutional, stating that:
[We] cannot accept the defendant's premise that the fundamental
right to bear and raise children has been interfered with merely
because a parent is held responsible for his child's torts. With the
right to bear and raise children comes the responsibility to see that
one's children are
properly raised so that the rights of other people
45
are protected.
While beyond the scope of this note, it bears mentioning that the
Civil law jurisdictions of Louisiana and Hawaii have statutory laws
which are unhampered by common law principals. These statutes hold
parents strictly liable, with certain exceptions, for their child's wrongs.
In these states, such liability is based solely on the familial
46
relationship.

VI.

Proposed Direction for Parental Liability in Florida

Snow v. Nelson14 7 provides Florida's Supreme Court with the opportunity to take another look at the issue of parental liability for the
acts of minor children, specifically in the area of negligent parental
supervision. The 1955 decision in Gissen v. Goodwill 48 created confusion in this area of Florida tort law. As the Third District Court of
Appeal said of Gissen in Snow, "the Supreme Court's holding in
Gissen, purporting to adopt the similar acts rule, . . . instead creat[ed]
a 'particular acts' rule."' 149 The Snows, in their Petitioner's brief to
142. Id. at 323-24, 130 S.E.2d at 650.
143. 34 Conn. Super. 7, 373 A.2d 191 (1977).
144. Id. at 8, 373 A.2d at 192.
145. Id.
146. See HAWAI REV. STAT. § 577-3 (1976); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2318
(West 1979). See also Bryan v. Kitamura, 529 Fed. Supp. 394 (D. Hawaii 1982);
Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975); Marvin, Discerningthe Parent's Liabil-

ity for the Harm Inflicted by a Nondiscerning Child, 44 LA. L. REv. 1213 (1984).
147.
148.
149.

450 So. 2d at 269.
80 So. 2d at 701.
Snow, 450 So. 2d at 274.
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Florida's Supreme Court have emphatically asserted that "[t]here exists in this state no 'particularacts' rule!"150 The Nelsons, on the other
hand, stated in their brief to the District Court of Appeal that
"[a]bsent the specific type of notice that is set out in Gissen, no liability can be found as a matter of law." 1 51
The Third District Court of Appeal examined the various alternatives and stated that the "broader rule, . . . a requirement of reasonable care in the circumstances, short of some form of vicarious liability,
is the better rule. '15 2 This is similar to the position advocated by the
Snow petitioner.
It is submitted that the particular acts rule, if it indeed exists,
should be modified. Currently, under this type of law the parents of a
chronic but creative delinquent can dodge serious liability with a total
disregard for their parental duties. 53 It is inconsistent with the tort
principle of accountability that the parental duty to exercise restraint
and control arises only upon notice of a child's habitual performance of
a single wrongful act. For that matter, a requirement that the child's
actions constitute a course of conduct containing 'similar acts' is not
without its problems either. How many acts make up a course of conduct? Three? Ten?
Arguably, the better rule would allow the jury to consider the seriousness of the child's previous act or acts to determine the need, in
each situation, for parental action. As previously submitted, the underlying question is: When does this parental duty to exercise control
arise? It appears that the Florida Supreme Court has already answered
this question in the general negligence case Stevens v. Jefferson,5 4 by
stating, "[t]he extent of the defendant's duty is circumscribed by the
scope of the anticipated risks to which the defendant exposes
others."' 5 5

150. Brief for Petitioner at 21, Snow v. Nelson, No. 65,391 (Fla. filed June 4,
1984) (emphasis in original).
151. Brief for Appellee at 10, Snow v. Nelson, 450 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
152. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 272-73.
153. See generally Murray, Domestic Relations, Second Survey of Florida Law,
12 U. MIAMI L.Q. 317, 352 (1956).
154. 436 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1983).
155. Id. at 35, (quoting with approval Crislip v. Holland, 401 So. 2d 1115, 1117
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)). The full summary of state negligence law was stated
as follows:
An action for negligence is predicated upon the existence of a legal duty
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Thus, the parents of a child who maliciously beats another child
on one occasion might have a greater duty to reprimand him than the
parents of a child who has played roughly on a few occasions. This
general negligence approach would allow each case to be examined on
its merits, with the ultimate determination of negligence being made by
the jury. Logically, the requirements for parental negligence should be
commensurate with the requirements of any other negligence action.
Upon receiving notice of their child's scurrilous disposition, parents are
to protect the world at large by deterring continuance of this activity.
The extent of this duty will depend on the severity of the child's misdeeds and the probability that others will be harmed if such actions
continue. With this duty the parent should at least make an effort to
exercise restraint over the child. It is the parents' failure to act which is
the basis for liability. Parents who try but fail to control their child's
conduct should not be accountable for this failure. However, those parents who merely acquiesce to the actions of their mischievous offspring
effectively sanction the resulting consequences.
Considering the unique procedural posture in Snow, 156 the first issue in resolving this case under a general negligence approach should
be whether the notice received by Mark Nelson's parents was of such a
nature that it imposed on them the duty to reprimand their son. If in
fact they were told only that "Mark plays too rough,"' 5 7 the sufficiency
of this notice is questionable. The threshold question is whether Mark's
prior conduct, as conveyed to his parents, was severe enough to warrant his reprimand. To determine this severity, the necessary inquiry is
whether his 'rough play' would expose others to an unreasonable risk of
harm. If so, was the type of harm suffered by Randall Snow "within
owed by the defendant to protect the plaintiff from an unreasonable risk of
harm. The extent of the defendant's duty is circumscribed by the scope of
the anticipated risks to which the defendant exposes others. In order to
prevail in a lawsuit, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he is within the
zone of risks that are reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. The liability of the tortfeasor does not depend upon whether his negligent acts were
the direct cause of the plaintiffs injuries, as long as the injuries incurred
were the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the tortfeasor's conduct.
If the harm is within the scope of danger created by the defendant's conduct, then such harm is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the negligence. The question of foreseeability and whether an intervening cause is
foreseeable is for the trier of fact.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
156. See supra note 35.
157. See supra text accompanying note 34.
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the zone of risks . . . reasonably foreseeable by [Mr. and Mrs. Nelson] ?"158 Arguably, this foreseeability requirement has not been met in
this case. It appears that the Snows have attempted to show that
Mark's previous actions constituted a pattern such that a subsequent
incident and injury was a foreseeable consequence of his prior conduct.
A close examination of this pattern reveals that all prior alleged conduct was intentional. 159 It is submitted that Mark Nelson's behavior
which resulted in Randall's injury, amounted to negligence. The Snows
have not contended that Mark willfully, maliciously or intentionally
struck Randall with the croquet mallet.
A distinction should be made between injuries which a minor inflicts intentionally versus those inflicted negligently. While plausible, it
does not seem likely that a child's negligent conduct becomes reasonably foreseeable upon notice that he has committed prior wrongful acts
which were intentional. Of course, these are considerations which go
towards proximate cause and foreseeability, and as such they are questions for the trier of fact. The Snow trial judge granted a directed verdict in favor of the Nelsons, but still allowed the jury to reach a verdict
for judicial economy. 60 In that jury's determination, Mark Nelson's
parents were negligent in the supervision of their son.' 6 '

VII.

Conclusion

While minors inflict large amounts of damage, they rarely compensate
their victims. The common law rules which disallowed vicarious liability from being imputed on parents have been relaxed to allow such liability on more occasions. In fact, every American state has passed a
parental liability statute, holding parents vicariously liable, to a limited
extent, for their children's torts. 6 2 With a single exception, these statutes have withstood constitutional challenges. 6 3 Some courts have held
that these statutes promote valid public interests and are thus within
the state's police power.16 Their provisions for limited recovery indicate that redress of the victim is not always the 'interest' being promoted. In fact some courts have acknowledged that these statutes are
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

note 155 for full summary of state negligence law.
supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
supra note 35.
supra note 35.
table of statutes in note 115.
supra notes 130-45 and accompanying text.
supra note 142 and accompanying text.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/8

24

Levine: Parental Liability for the Torts of Their Minor Children: Limits,

1984]

ParentalLiability for Torts of Children

more punitive in nature than they are compensatory.' 6 5
Florida's statute, providing limited vicarious liability for property
damage, has been held constitutional. 168 However, its common law
based counterpart, providing unlimited liability for negligent parental
supervision, has been characterized by an intermediate state appellate
court as "harsh doctrine from a distant and dissimilar era.1 1 7 Thus,
the Supreme Court of Florida has an opportunity to give new consideration to this sensitive issue. While faced with various alternatives, the
state should treat this type of negligence action as it does all negligence
actions. It is a parental duty to protect the world at large from unreasonable risks of harm which become foreseeable upon notice of their
child's wrongful conduct. The extent of this duty shall rise as the magnitude of the threatened harm becomes more severe.
Robert Charles Levine

165.
166.
167.

See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
See supra note 41.
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